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a b s t r a c t
We introduce a new multi-player geometric game, which we will refer to as the isolation
game, and study its Nash equilibria and best or better response dynamics. The isolation
game is inspired by the Voronoi game, competitive facility location, and geometric
sampling. In the Voronoi game studied by Dürr and Thang, each player’s objective is to
maximize the area of her Voronoi region. In contrast, in the isolation game, each player’s
objective is to position herself as far away from other players as possible in a bounded
space.
Even though this game has a simple definition, we show that its game-theoretic
behaviors are quite rich and complex. We consider various measures of farness from one
player to a groupof players and analyze their impacts to the existence ofNash equilibria and
to the convergence of the best or better response dynamics: We prove that it is NP-hard to
decide whether a Nash equilibrium exists, using either a very simple farness measure in an
asymmetric space or a slightly more sophisticated farness measure in a symmetric space.
Complementing these hardness results, we establish existence theorems for several special
families of farness measures in symmetric spaces: We prove that, for isolation games
where each player wants to maximize her distance to hermth nearest neighbor, for anym,
equilibria always exist. Moreover, there is always a better response sequence starting from
any configuration that leads to a Nash equilibrium. We show that whenm = 1 the game is
a potential game, no better response sequence has a cycle, but whenm > 1 the games are
not potential. More generally, we study farness functions that give different weights to a
player’s distances to others based on the distance rankings, and obtain both existence and
hardness results when the weights are monotonically increasing or decreasing. Finally, we
present results on the hardness of computing best responseswhen the space has a compact
representation as a hypercube.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In competitive facility location [4,5,7], data clustering [8], and geometric sampling [10], a fundamental geometric problem
is to place a set of objects (such as facilities and cluster centers) in a space so that they are mutually far away from one
another. Inspired by the study of Dürr and Thang [3] on the Voronoi game, we introduce a new multi-player geometric
game called isolation game.
In an isolation game, there are k players that will locate themselves in a space (Ω,∆)where∆(x, y) defines the pairwise
distance among points in Ω . If ∆(x, y) = ∆(y, x), for all x, y ∈ Ω , we say (Ω,∆) is symmetric. The ith player has a
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(k − 1)-place function fi(. . . ,∆(pi, pi−1),∆(pi, pi+1), . . .) from the k − 1 distances to all other players to a real value,
measuring the farness from her location pi to the locations of other players. The objective of player i is to maximize
fi(. . . ,∆(pi, pi−1),∆(pi, pi+1), . . .), once the positions of other players (. . . , pi−1, pi+1, . . .) are given.
Depending on applications, there could be different ways to measure the farness from a point to a set of points. The
simplest farness function fi() could be the one that measures the distance from pi to her nearest player. Games based on this
measure are called nearest-neighbor games. Another simple measure is the total distance from pi to other players. Games
based on this measure are called total distance games. Other farness measures include the distance of pi to her mth nearest
player, or a weighted combination of the distances from player i to other players.
In some cases, the isolation gameswith simple farnessmeasures have similar behaviors as themulti-player Voronoi game
[1,2,6] in discrete spaces. Recall that in the Voronoi game, the objective of each player is tomaximize the area of her Voronoi
cell in Ω induced by {p1, . . . , pk} — the set of points in Ω that are closer to pi than to any other player. The Voronoi game
has applications in competitive facility location, where merchants try to place their facilities to maximize their customer
bases, and customers are assumed to go to the facility closest to them. Each player needs to calculate the area of her Voronoi
cell to play the game, which could be expensive. In the nearest-neighbor isolation game, each player chooses to maximize
her nearest-neighbor distance to other players. In some discrete spaces, like the discrete cycle graph, the longer nearest-
neighbor distance a player has, the larger Voronoi area this player gains. This gives rise to the isolation game with these
special farness measures.
The generalized isolation games may have applications in product design in a competitive market, where companies’
profits may depend on the dissimilarity of their products to those of their competitors, which could be measured by the
multi-dimensional features of products. Companies differentiate their products from those of their competitors by playing
some kind of isolation games in the multi-dimensional feature space. The isolation game may also have some connection
with political campaigns such as in a multi-candidate election, in which candidates, constrained by their histories of
public service records, try to position themselves in the multi-dimensional space of policies and political views in order
to differentiate themselves from other candidates.
We study the Nash equilibria [9] and best or better response dynamics of the isolation games. We consider various
measures of farness from one player to a group of players and analyze their impact to the existence of Nash equilibria and
to the convergence of best or better response dynamics in an isolation game. For simple measures such as the nearest-
neighbor and the total-distance, it is quite straightforward to show that these isolation games are potential games when
the underlying space is symmetric. Hence, the game has at least one Nash equilibrium and all better response dynamics
converge. Surprisingly, we show that when the underlying space is asymmetric, Nash equilibria may not exist, and it is
NP-hard to determine whether Nash equilibria exist in an isolation game.
The general isolation game is far more complex even for symmetric spaces, even if we restrict our attention only
to uniform anonymous isolation games. We say an isolation game is anonymous if, for all i, fi() is invariant under the
permutation of its parameters. We say an anonymous isolation game is uniform if fi() = fj() for all i, j. For instance, the two
potential isolation games with the nearest-neighbor or total-distance measure mentioned above are uniform anonymous
games. Even these classes of games exhibit different behaviors: some subclass of games always have Nash equilibria, some
can always find better response sequences that converge to a Nash equilibrium, but somemay not have Nash equilibria and
determining the existence of a Nash equilibrium is NP-complete. We summarize our findings below.
First, we prove that for isolation games where each player wants to maximize her distance to hermth nearest neighbor,
Nash equilibria always exist. In addition, there is always a better response sequence starting from any configuration that
leads to a Nash equilibrium.We show, however, that this isolation game is not a potential game — there are better response
sequences that lead to cycles. Second, as a general framework, wemodel the farness function of a uniform anonymous game
by a vector Ew = (w1, w2, . . . , wk−1). Let Edj = (dj,1, dj,2, . . . , dj,k−1) be the distance vector of player j in a configuration,which
are distances from player j to the other k− 1 players sorted in nondecreasing order, i.e., dj,1 ≤ dj,2 ≤ · · · ≤ dj,k−1. Then the
utility of player j in the configuration is Ew · Ed = ∑k−1i=1 (wi · dj,i). We show that a Nash equilibrium exists for increasing
or decreasing weight vectors Ew, when the underlying space (Ω,∆) satisfies certain conditions, which are different for
increasing and decreasing weight vectors. For a particular version of the decreasing weight vectors, namely (1, 1, 0, . . . , 0),
we show that: (a) it is not potential even on a continuous one dimensional circular space; (b) starting from any configuration
there is a best-response sequence that converges to a Nash equilibrium in a continuous one dimensional circular space; (c) in
general symmetric spaces a Nash equilibriummay not exist, and (d) it is NP-complete to decide if a Nash equilibrium exists
in general symmetric spaces. Combining with the previous NP-completeness result, we see that either a complicated space
(asymmetric space) or a slightly complicated farness measure ((1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) instead of (1, 0 . . . , 0) or (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0))
would make the determination of the existence of Nash equilibria difficult.
Table 1 summarizes the rich behaviors we found for various versions of the isolation games.
We also examine the hardness of computing best responses in spaces with compact representations such as a hypercube.
We show that, for one class of isolation games, including the nearest-neighbor game as the special case, it is NP-complete
to compute best responses, while for another class of isolation games, the computation can be done in polynomial time.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers the basic definitions and notation. Section 3 presents
the results for nearest-neighbor and total-distance isolation games. Section 4 presents results for other general classes of
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Table 1
Summary of results for various isolation games. ‘‘NE’’ stands for Nash Equilibrium; ‘‘NPC’’ means NP-complete to determine if a Nash equilibrium exists.
Farness function Complexity of space (Ω,∆)
1-d continuous circular Polarized Finite Symmetric Asymmetric
1, 1, 1, . . . , 1 Potential Potential Potential Potential [Theorem 2] NPC [Theorem 4] [Corollary 5]
1, 0, 0, . . . , 0 Potential Potential Potential Potential [Theorem 1] NPC [Theorem 4] [Corollary 5]
0, 1, 0, . . . , 0 Not potential
[Lemma 7]
∃ best-response
sequence to NE
[Theorem 9]
∃ NE [Theorem 6]
1, 1, 0, . . . , 0 Not potential
[Lemma 13], ∃ best-
response sequence to
NE [Theorem 14]
NPC [Theorem 16]
Single selection ∃ better-response
sequence to NE
[Theorem 8]
∃ NE [Theorem 6]
Monotonic increasing ∃ NE ∃ NE [Theorem 10]
Monotonic decreasing ∃ NE [Corollary 12] not
Potential [Lemma 13]
NPC [Theorem 16]
isolation games. Section 5 examines the hardness of computing best responses in isolation games. We conclude the paper
in Section 6.
2. Notation
We use (Ω,∆) to denote the underlying space, where we assume ∆(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ Ω , ∆(x, y) > 0 for
all x, y ∈ Ω and x 6= y, and that (Ω,∆) is bounded — there exists a real value B such that ∆(x, y) ≤ B for every
x, y ∈ Ω . In general, (Ω,∆) may not be symmetric or satisfy the triangle inequality. We always assume that there are
k players in an isolation game and each player’s strategy set is the entireΩ . A configuration of an isolation game is a vector
(p1, p2, . . . , pk), where pi ∈ Ω specifies the position of player i. The utility function of player i is a (k − 1)-place function
fi(. . . ,∆(pi, pi−1),∆(pi, pi+1), . . .). For convenience, we use ut i(c) to denote the utility of player i in configuration c .
We consider several classes of weight vectors in the uniform, anonymous isolation game. In particular, the nearest-
neighbor and total-distance isolation games have the weight vectors (1, 0, . . . , 0) and (1, 1, . . . , 1), respectively; the single-
selection games have vectors that have exactly one nonzero entry; the monotonically-increasing (or decreasing) games have
vectors whose entries are monotonically increasing (or decreasing).
A better response of player i in configuration c = (p1, . . . , pk) is a new position p′i 6= pi such that the utility of player
i in configuration c ′ by replacing pi with p′i in c is larger than her utility in c. In this case, we say that c ′ is the result of a
better-response move of player i in configuration c . A best response of player i in configuration c = (p1, . . . , pk) is a new
position p′i 6= pi that maximizes the utility of player i while player j remains at position pj for all j 6= i. In this case, we say
that c ′ is the result of a best-response move of player i in configuration c .
A (pure) Nash equilibrium of an isolation game is a configuration in which no player has any better response in the
configuration. An isolation game is better-response potential (or best-response potential) if there is a function F from the set of
all configurations to a totally ordered set such that F(c) < F(c ′) for any two configurations c and c ′ where c ′ is the result of a
better-responsemove (or a best-responsemove) of some player at configuration c. We call F a potential function. It is easy to
see that any better- (best-) response sequence in a better- (best-) response potential game is acyclic, and further more ifΩ
is finite, any better- (best-) response sequence eventually leads to a Nash equilibrium. Note that a better-response potential
game is also a best-response potential game, but a best-response potential game may not be a better-response potential
game. Henceforth, we use the shorthand ‘‘potential games’’ to refer to better-response potential games.
3. Nearest-neighbor and total-distance isolation games
In this section, we focus on the isolation games with weight vectors (1, 0, . . . , 0) and (1, 1, . . . , 1). We show that both
are potential games whenΩ is symmetric, but whenΩ is asymmetric and finite, it is NP-complete to decide whether those
games have Nash equilibria.
Theorem 1. The symmetric nearest-neighbor isolation game is a potential game.
Proof. Consider a configuration c = (p1, p2, . . . , pk). The utility of player i in configuration c in the nearest-neighbor
isolation game is the distance between player i and her nearest neighbor. Let vector Eu(c) = (u1, u2, . . . , uk) be the vector
of the utility values of all players in c sorted in increasing order, i.e., u1 ≤ u2 ≤ · · · ≤ uk.
We claim that for any configuration c and c ′ such that c ′ is the result of a better-responsemove of a player i from position
pi to p′i 6= pi, we have Eu(c) < Eu(c ′) in lexicographic order.
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Let Eu(c) = (u1, u2, . . . , uk), and uj be the utility of player i in c (i.e. ut i(c) = uj). Consider another player s 6= i and her
utility ut = uts(c). There are three cases. Case 1: ut < uj. SinceΩ is symmetric, ut cannot be the distance from s to i. Thus,
after i’s better-response move, the utility of s in c ′ is still ut . Case 2: ut > uj. After i’s better-response move, if the utility of
s decreases, then uts(c ′) = ∆(ps, p′i) = ∆(p′i, ps) ≥ ut i(c ′) > ut i(c) = uj. That is, in any case the utility of s in c ′ is greater
than uj. Case 3: ut = uj. After i’s better-response move, the utility of s either remains the same or increases.
Therefore, comparing vector Eu(c ′) with Eu(c), all elements in front of uj remain the same or increase, and all elements
after uj either remain the same or the new value is greater than uj, and uj itself increases. This implies that Eu(c ′) > Eu(c) in
lexicographic order. Thus, the above claim holds.
We now can define a potential function F(c) = Eu(c) to show that the nearest-neighbor isolation game is potential. 
Theorem 2. The symmetric total-distance isolation game is a potential game.
Proof. We define a function F on configurations c = (p1, p2, . . . , pk) to be F(c) = ∑1≤i,j≤k∆(pi, pj), the sum of all
pairwise distances of players in the configuration. If a player i has a better response p′i 6= pi in c , then we know that∑
j6=i∆(p
′
i, pj) >
∑
j6=i∆(pi, pj). Since Ω is symmetric, we have F(c ′) − F(c) = (
∑
j,`6=i∆(p`, pj) +
∑
j6=i∆(p
′
i, pj)) −
(
∑
j,`6=i∆(p`, pj) +
∑
j6=i∆(pi, pj)) > 0. Therefore, F is a potential function, and the total-distance isolation game is
potential. 
The following lemma shows that the asymmetric isolation game may not have any Nash equilibrium for any nonzero
weight vector. Thus, it also implies that asymmetric nearest-neighbor and total-distance isolation games may not have
Nash equilibria.
Lemma 3. Consider an asymmetric spaceΩ = {v1, v2, . . . , v`+1}with the distance function given by the following matrix with
t ≥ `+ 1. Suppose that for every player i her weight vector Ewi has at least one nonzero entry. Then, for any 2 ≤ k ≤ `, there is
no Nash equilibrium in the k-player isolation game.

∆ v1 v2 v3 . . . v` v`+1
v1 0 t − 1 t − 2 . . . t − `+ 1 t − `
v2 t − ` 0 t − 1 . . . t − `+ 2 t − `+ 1
...
...
. . .
...
v` t − 2 t − 3 t − 4 . . . 0 t − 1
v`+1 t − 1 t − 2 t − 3 . . . t − ` 0
 .
Proof. Consider any configuration c. Because 2 ≤ k ≤ ` and |Ω| = `+1, in configuration c there exists at least one free point
not occupied by any player.Without loss of generality, we assume that one of the free points is vi and the point vi−1 is already
chosen by player t (if vi = v1, then vi−1 = v`+1). Then we can see that for all j 6= i and j 6= i − 1, ∆(vi, vj) > ∆(vi−1, vj).
Since all weights are nonnegative and at least one weight is nonzero, player t could achieve better utility by moving from
vi−1 to vi. Therefore, c is not a Nash equilibrium. 
Theorem 4. It is NP-complete to decide whether a finite, asymmetric nearest-neighbor or total-distance isolation game has a
Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We first prove the case of the nearest-neighbor isolation game.
Suppose that the size of Ω is n. Then the distance function ∆ has n2 entries. The decision problem is clearly in NP. The
NP-hardness can be proved by reduction from the Set Packing problem. An instance of the Set Packing problem includes a
set I = {e1, e2, . . . , em} ofm elements, a set S = {S1, . . . , Sn} of n subsets of I , and a positive integer k. The decision problem
is to decide whether there are k disjoint subsets in S. We now give the reduction.
The spaceΩ has n+ k+ 1 points, divided into a left set L = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} and a right set R = {u1, u2, . . . , uk+1}. For
any two different points vi, vj ∈ L,∆(vi, vj) = 2n if Si ∩ Sj = ∅, and∆(vi, vj) = 1/2 otherwise. The distance function on R
is given by the distance matrix in Lemma 3 with ` = k and t = k + 1. For any v ∈ L and u ∈ R, ∆(v, u) = ∆(u, v) = 2n.
Finally, the isolation game has k+ 1 players.
We now show that there exists a Nash equilibrium for the nearest-neighbor isolation game onΩ if and only if there are
k disjoint subsets in the Set Packing instance.
First, suppose that there is a solution to the Set Packing instance. Without loss of generality, assume that the k
disjoint subsets are S1, S2, . . . , Sk. Then we claim that configuration c = (v1, v2, . . . , vk, u1) is a Nash equilibrium. In this
configuration, it is easy to verify that every player’s utility is 2n, the largest possible pairwise distance. Therefore, c is a Nash
equilibrium.
Conversely, suppose that there is a Nash equilibrium in the nearest-neighbor isolation game. Consider the set R. If there
is a Nash equilibrium c , then the number of players positioned in R is either k+ 1 or at most 1 because of Lemma 3. If there
are k + 1 players in R, then every player has utility 1, and thus each of them would want to move to points in L to obtain a
utility of 2n. Therefore, there cannot be k+1 players positioned in R, whichmeans that there are at least k players positioned
in L.
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Without loss of generality, assume that these k players occupy points v1, v2, . . . , vk (which may have duplicates). We
claim that subsets S1, S2, . . . , Sk form a solution to the Set Packing problem. Suppose, for a contradiction, that this is not
true, which means there exist Si and Sj among these k subsets that intersect with each other. By our construction, we have
∆(vi, vj) = 0 or 1/2. In this case, players at point vi and vj would want to move to some free points in R, since that will give
them utilities of at least 1. This contradicts the assumption that c is a Nash equilibrium. Therefore, we find a solution for the
Set Packing problem given a Nash equilibrium c of the nearest-neighbor isolation game.
The proof for the case of the total-distance isolation game is essentially the same, with only changes in players’ utility
values. 
If the space is infinite and asymmetric, we can also make reduction from the Set Packing problem. Given an instance of
the Set Packing problem, we can construct a (k+ 1)-player isolation game. There are two types of points in the game space
Ω: ‘‘particular’’ points and ‘‘normal’’ points.
There are n+k+1 ‘‘particular’’ points, divided into a left set L and a right set R. The distances between ‘‘particular’’ points
are defined the same as in Theorem 4. There are infinitely many ‘‘normal’’ points. For these ‘‘normal’’ points, let the distance
between any two remaining points be 0 and let the distance between any ‘‘particular’’ point and any ‘‘normal’’ point be 0.
With similar analysis, we can prove that the Set Packing instance has a solution if and only if there is a Nash equilibrium
for the nearest-neighbor isolation game onΩ . The proof for the case of the total-distance isolation game in an infinite and
asymmetric space is essentially the same with only changes in players’ utility values. Hence we get the following corollary.
Corollary 5. It is NP-complete to decide whether an infinite, asymmetric nearest-neighbor or total-distance isolation game has a
Nash equilibrium.
4. Isolation games with other weight vectors
In this section, we study several general classes of isolation games. We consider symmetric space (Ω,∆) in this section.
4.1. Single-selection isolation games
First we consider the single-selection isolation games. Recall that the single-selection games have weight vectors that
have exactly one nonzero entry.
Theorem 6. A Nash equilibrium always exists in any single-selection symmetric game.
Proof. We denote the k-player single-selection symmetric game as G, in which themth entry of the weight vector is 1. We
partition the k players into t = d kme groups G1,G2, . . . ,Gt . If m | k, then let each group consist of m players; otherwise,
let each group except Gt consist of m players, and let Gt consist of the remaining k − (t − 1)m players. We denote a
t-player nearest-neighbor isolation game onΩ asG′. By Theorem1,we know that in gameG′ there exists a Nash equilibrium
c ′ = (p1, . . . , pt). Without loss of generality, we assume that in G′ player t at pt has the minimum utility value among all
the t players. Nowwe generate a configuration c for game G in which all the players in group Gi choose position pi. We show
that c is a Nash equilibrium for game G.
Ifm | k, we consider an arbitrary player i of game G that belongs to group Gj and locates at pj. It is easy to verify that the
utility of player i of game G in c equals the utility of player j of game G′ in c ′, because each group consists of m players. If
player i of game G could increase her utility to∆(pa, pb) by moving to pa, then player j of game G′ would also have a better
response of pa to increase her utility to ∆(pa, pb), which contradicts the assumption that c ′ is a Nash equilibrium of game
G′. Hence no player of game G in the configuration c has a better response, and thus c is a Nash equilibrium for game G.
Ifm - k, we consider an arbitrary player i of game G that belongs to group Gj and locates at pj. Suppose that the position
of them-th nearest neighbor of player i in configuration c of game G is pu. It is easy to verify that pu is also the position of the
nearest neighbor of player j in configuration c ′ of game G′. Suppose, for a contradiction, that player i of game G has a better
response pa. We consider the following cases.
Case 1: pa 6∈ {p1, . . . , pt}. Then in game G′, player j could move to position pa and strictly increase her utility, which
contradicts the assumption that c ′ is a Nash equilibrium for game G′.
Case 2: pa ∈ {p1, . . . , pt−1}. This is impossible because in game G, at each position in {p1, . . . , pt−1}, there are m players,
and if player imoves to pa 6= pj, herm nearest neighbors are all at position pa and thus her utility would be zero.
Case 3: pa = pt . Since group Gt has less thanm players, themth nearest neighbor of player i after her move is positioned at
some point ps 6= pt . Since this is a better response of player i in game G, we have ∆(pt , ps) > ∆(pj, pu). It is easy to verify
that ps is the position of the nearest neighbor of player t in configuration c ′ of game G′. Thus we have that in game G′ player
t ’s utility in configuration c ′ is larger than player j’s utility in c ′, which contradicts our selection of pt .
We reach contradictions in all three cases. Therefore, c must be a Nash equilibrium of game G. 
Although Nash equilibria always exist in single-selection isolation games, the following lemma shows that they are not
potential games.
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Fig. 1. An example of a better-response sequence that loops forever for a five-player isolation game with weight vector (0, 1, 0, 0) on a one dimensional
circular space with six points.
Lemma 7. LetΩ = {A, B, C,D, E, F} contain six points on a one-dimensional circular space with∆(A, B) = 15,∆(B, C) = 11,
∆(C,D) = 14, ∆(D, E) = 16, ∆(E, F) = 13, and ∆(F , A) = 12. The five-player single-selection game with the weight vector
(0, 1, 0, 0) onΩ is not potential.
Proof. Let the five players stand at A, B, C , D, and E respectively in the initial configuration. Their better response dynamics
can iterate forever as shown in Fig. 1. Hence this game is not a potential game. 
Surprisingly, the following theorem complements the previous lemma.
Theorem 8. If Ω is finite, then for any single-selection game on Ω and any starting configuration c, there is a better-response
sequence in the game that leads to a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that the nonzero weight entry is the mth entry in the k-player single-selection isolation game with m > 1
(the case of m = 1 is already covered in the nearest-neighbor isolation game). For any configuration c = (p1, . . . , pk), the
utility of player i is the distance between player i and her mth nearest neighbor. Let vector Eu(c) = (u1, u2, . . . , uk) be the
vector of the utility values of all players in c sorted in nondecreasing order, i.e., u1 ≤ u2 ≤ · · · ≤ uk. We claim that for any
configuration c , if c is not a Nash equilibrium, theremust exist a finite sequence of configurations c = c0, c1, c2, . . . , ct = c ′,
such that ci+1 is the result of a better-response move of some player in ci for i = 0, 1, . . . , t − 1 and Eu(c) < Eu(c ′) in
lexicographic order.
We now prove this claim. Since the starting configuration c0 = c is not a Nash equilibrium, there exists a player i
that can make a better response move to position p, resulting in configuration c1. We have ut i(c0) < ut i(c1). Let Si be
the set of player i’s m − 1 nearest neighbors in configuration c1. We now repeat the following steps to find configurations
c2, . . . , ct . When in configuration cj, we select a player aj in Si such that utaj(cj) < ut i(c1) and move aj to position p, the
same position where player i locates. This gives configuration cj+1. This is certainly a better-response move for aj because
utaj(cj+1) = ut i(cj+1) = ut i(c1) > utaj(cj), where the second equality holds because we only move the m − 1 nearest
neighbors of player i in c1 to the same position as i, so it does not affect the distance from i to hermth nearest neighbor. The
repeating step ends when there is no more such player aj in configuration cj, in which case cj = ct = c ′.
We now show that Eu(c) < Eu(c ′) in lexicographic order. We first consider any player j 6∈ Si. Either her utility does
not change (ut j(c) = ut j(c ′)), or her utility change must be due to the changes of her distances to player i and players
a1, a2, . . . , at−1, who have moved to position p. Suppose that player j is at position q. Then∆(p, q) ≥ ut i(c1) because j 6∈ Si.
This means that if j’s utility changes, her new utility ut j(c ′) must be at least ∆(p, q) ≥ ut i(c1). For a player j ∈ Si, if she is
one of {a1, . . . , at−1}, then her new utility ut j(c ′) = ut i(c ′) = ut i(c1); if she is not one of {a1, . . . , at−1}, then by definition
ut j(c ′) ≥ ut i(c1). Therefore, comparing the utilities of every player in c and c ′, we know that either her utility does not
change, or her new utility is at least ut i(c ′) = ut i(c1) > ut i(c), and at least player i herself strictly increases her utility from
ut i(c) to ut i(c ′). With this result, it is straightforward to verify that Eu(c) < Eu(c ′). Thus, our claim holds.
We may call the better-response sequence found in the above claim an epoch. We can apply the above claim to
concatenate new epochs such that at the end of each epoch the vector Eu strictly increases in lexicographic order. Since
the space Ω is finite, the vector Eu has an upper bound. Therefore, after a finite number of epochs, we must be able to find
a Nash equilibrium, and all these epochs concatenated together form a better-response sequence that leads to the Nash
equilibrium. This is clearly true when starting from any initial configuration. 
We now consider a simple class of single-selection isolation games with weight vector Ew = (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), for which
we are able to achieve the following stronger result than Theorem 8.
Theorem 9. If Ω is finite, then for any isolation game with weight vector Ew = (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) on Ω and any starting
configuration c, there is a best-response sequence in the game that leads to a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Since the weight vector is Ew = (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), for any configuration c = (p1, p2, . . . , pk), the utility of player i is
the distance between player i and her second nearest neighbor. Let vector Eu(c) = (u1, u2, . . . , uk) be the vector of the utility
values of all players in c sorted in nondecreasing order, i.e., u1 ≤ u2 ≤ · · · ≤ uk. We claim that for any configuration c , if c
is not a Nash equilibrium, there must exist a finite sequence of configurations c = c0, c1, c2, . . . , ct = c ′, such that ci+1 is
the result of a best-response move of some player in ci for i = 0, 1, . . . , t − 1 and Eu(c) < Eu(c ′) in lexicographic order.
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Wenow prove this claim. Since the starting configuration c0 = c is not a Nash equilibrium, there exists a player i that can
make a best response move to position p, resulting in configuration c1. We have ut i(c0) < ut i(c1). Suppose that the nearest
neighbor of player i in configuration c1 is player j1 and her position is pj1 .
First we consider any player t such that t 6= j1, and suppose her position is pt in both c0 and c1. We show that if
ut t(c1) < ut t(c0), then ut t(c1) ≥ ut i(c1). If this is not true, since only player i moves in configuration c0 resulting
in c1, the decrease of player t ’s utility must be caused by the change in distance between player i and player t , i.e.,
∆(p, pt) ≤ ut t(c1). Then we have ∆(p, pt) ≤ ut t(c1) < ut i(c1). Since player j1 is the nearest neighbor of i in c1, we have
∆(p, pj1) ≤ ∆(p, pt) < ut i(c1). However, since the utility of player i is her distance to the second nearest neighbor, we have
ut i(c1) ≤ max(∆(p, pt),∆(p, pj1)), a contradiction.
Thus, we know from above that for any player t 6= j1, her utility either does not decrease, or decreases but is still at least
ut i(c1). Now consider player j1. If ut j1(c1) ≥ ut i(c1), then it is easy to verify that Eu(c0) < Eu(c1). In this case, let c ′ = c1 and
we are done.
Suppose now that ut j1(c1) < ut i(c1). We select player j1 for the next best response move. Suppose player j1 has a best
response position q and the configuration changes to c2. Note that player j1 couldmove to position p and overlapwith player
i, in which case her new utility is ut j1(c2) = ut i(c1). Thus we know that ut j1(c2) ≥ ut i(c1). If ut j1(c2) = ut i(c1), we can select
q to be p, i.e., overlapping j1 with i to achieve the best utility. In this case, it is again easy to verify that Eu(c0) < Eu(c2), and we
let c ′ = c2 and we are done. If ut j1(c2) > ut i(c1), suppose j2 is the nearest neighbor of j1 in configuration c2. We can repeat
the above argument on j2 in configuration c2, and so on.
The above iteration either stops after a finite number of rounds, in which case we find a sequence of configurations
c = c0, c1, c2, . . . , ct = c ′ such that ci+1 is the result of a best response move of some player in ci for i = 0, 1, . . . , t − 1,
and Eu(c) < Eu(c ′) in lexicographic order, or it continues infinitely often, in which case we find an infinite sequence of
configurations c0, c1, c2, . . . as well as an infinite sequence of players i, j1, j2, . . . such that ut i(c1) < ut j1(c2) < ut j2(c3) <
. . .. The latter cannot be true, because the space is finite and bounded, the utility (or the distance) sequence cannot increase
forever. Thus, our claim holds.
Wemay call the best-response sequence found in the above claim an epoch.We can apply the above claim to concatenate
new epochs such that at the end of each epoch the vector Eu strictly increases in lexicographic order. Since the space Ω is
finite, the vector Euhas an upper bound. Therefore, after a finite number of epochs,wemust be able to find aNash equilibrium,
and all these epochs concatenated together form a best-response sequence that leads to the Nash equilibrium. This is clearly
true when starting from any initial configuration. 
4.2. Monotonically-increasing games
For monotonically-increasing games, we provide the following general condition that guarantees the existence of a
Nash equilibrium. We say that a pair of points u, v ∈ Ω is a pair of polar points if for any point w ∈ Ω , the inequality
∆(u, w) + ∆(w, v) ≤ ∆(u, v) holds. We refer to spaces with a pair of polar points as polarized spaces, which include
n-dimensional sphere (one-dimensional circular space being a special case), n-dimensional grid with L1 norm as its distance
function, etc.
Theorem 10. IfΩ has a pair of polar points, then any monotonically-increasing isolation game onΩ has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the k-player monotonically-increasing game with weight vector Ew = (w1, . . . , wk−1) on Ω , where
w1 ≤ w2 ≤ . . . ≤ wk−1. Let (u, v) be a pair of polar points of Ω . Construct the following configuration c = (p1, . . . , pk)
such that p1 = · · · = pd k2 e = u and pd k2 e+1 = · · · = pk = v. We show below that c is a Nash equilibrium.
First we prove that for any player j at u, she has no better response in c. By definition, her utility in configuration c is
ut j(c) =
k−1∑
i=d k2 e
wi∆(u, v).
If player jmoves to positionw with∆(u, w) ≤ ∆(w, v) to obtain a new configuration c ′, then her new utility is
ut j(c ′) =
d k2 e−1∑
i=1
wi∆(u, w)+
k−1∑
i=d k2 e
wi∆(w, v)
≤ ∆(u, w)
k−1∑
i=d k2 e
wi +∆(w, v)
k−1∑
i=d k2 e
wi
(since the weight vector is monotonically increasing)
≤ ∆(u, v)
k−1∑
i=d k2 e
wi = ut j(c) (since (u, v) is a pair of polar points).
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If player jmoves tow with∆(u, w) > ∆(w, v) to obtain a new configuration c ′′, then her new utility is
ut j(c ′′) =
b k2 c∑
i=1
wi∆(w, v)+
k−1∑
i=b k2 c+1
wi∆(u, w)
≤ ∆(w, v)
k−1∑
i=d k2 e
wi +∆(u, w)
k−1∑
i=d k2 e
wi
≤ ∆(u, v)
k−1∑
i=d k2 e
wi = ut j(c).
Therefore, in either case, the utility of j does not increase after her move, and thus j has no better response in c.
In a similar manner, we can show that players at position v do not have better responses either. Therefore, configuration
c is a Nash equilibrium. 
4.3. Monotonically-decreasing games
Monotonically-decreasing games are more difficult to analyze than the previous variants of isolation games, and general
results are not yet available. In this section, we first present a positive result for monotonically-decreasing games in a
continuous one-dimensional circular space. We then present some hardness result for a simple type of weight vectors in
general symmetric spaces.
The following theorem is a general result with monotonically-decreasing games as its special cases.
Theorem 11. In a continuous one-dimensional circular space Ω , the isolation game on Ω with weight vector Ew = (w1, w2,
. . . , wk−1) always has a Nash equilibrium if
∑k−1
t=1(−1)twt ≤ 0.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that the length of the full one-dimensional circle is k. We consider the
configuration c = (p1, p2, . . . , pk) where ∆(pk, p1) = ∆(pi, pi+1) = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 . We show below that c is a
Nash equilibrium for the weight vector satisfying the condition in the theorem statement.
In configuration c , the distance vector of player i is Edi = (1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 3, . . .), and her utility is Ewi · Edi. Suppose that player
imoves from pi to pi′ and∆(pi, p′i) = j+  where j = 0, 1, . . . , b(k− 1)/2c, and 0 ≤  < 1. Note that there are in general
two points on the circle having the same distance to pi, and since they are symmetric, the analysis of these two cases is the
same. Let the new distance vector of player i after the move be Ed′i .
Case 1. 0 ≤  ≤ 1/2. In this case, we have
Ed′i = (, 1− , 1+ , 2− , . . . , j− 1+ , j− ︸ ︷︷ ︸
2j
, j+ 1− , j+ 1+ , j+ 2− , . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1−2j
).
And the difference of Edi and Ed′i is
Ed′i − Edi = ( − 1,−,  − 1,−, . . . ,  − 1,−︸ ︷︷ ︸
2j
,−, ,−, , . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−1−2j
).
Therefore, we have
Ew · ( Ed′i − Edi) ≤ −
2j∑
t=1
wt + 
k−1∑
t=2j+1
(−1)twt
(since  − 1 ≤ − when 0 ≤  ≤ 1/2)
≤ 
k−1∑
t=1
(−1)twt ≤ 0.
This means that in this case the move of player i does not improve her utility.
Case 2. 1/2 <  < 1. Note that in this case, when k is odd, j is at most (k − 3)/2, since, the largest distance to pi is
(k− 1)/2+ 1/2, implying  ≤ 1/2 when j = (k− 1)/2. Thus k− 2j− 2 ≥ 0. In this case, we have
Ed′i = (1− , , 2− , 1+ , . . . , j− 1+ , j+ 1− ︸ ︷︷ ︸
2j+1
, j+ 2− , j+ 1+ , j+ 3− , . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−2j−2
).
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Fig. 2. An example of a best-response sequence that loops forever for a five-player isolation game with weight vector (1, 1, 0, 0) on a one dimensional
circular space with six points.
Furthermore, we have
Ed′i − Edi = (−,  − 1,−,  − 1, . . . ,  − 1,−︸ ︷︷ ︸
2j+1
, 1− ,  − 1, 1− ,  − 1, . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
k−2j−2
).
Therefore, we have
Ew · ( Ed′i − Edi) ≤ −(1− )
2j+1∑
t=1
wt + (1− )
k−1∑
t=2j+2
(−1)twt
(since −  <  − 1 when 1/2 <  < 1)
≤ (1− )
k−1∑
t=1
(−1)twt ≤ 0.
Thus the move of player i does not improve her utility either in this case.
Combining the two cases above, we conclude that configuration c is a Nash equilibrium. 
A monotonically-decreasing isolation game with weight vector Ew = (w1, w2, . . . , wk−1) automatically satisfies the
condition
∑k−1
t=1(−1)twt ≤ 0. Hence we have the following corollary.
Corollary 12. In a continuous one-dimensional circular spaceΩ , any monotonically-decreasing isolation game onΩ has a Nash
equilibrium.
We now consider a simple class of monotonically-decreasing games with weight vector Ew = (1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) and
characterize the Nash equilibria of the isolation game in a continuous one-dimensional circular spaceΩ . Although the game
has a Nash equilibrium in a continuous one-dimensional circular space according to the above corollary, it is not potential,
as shown by the following lemma.
Lemma 13. Consider Ω = {A, B, C,D, E, F} that contains six points in a one-dimensional circular space with ∆(A, B) = 13,
∆(B, C) = 5, ∆(C,D) = 10, ∆(D, E) = 10, ∆(E, F) = 11, and ∆(F , A) = 8. The five-player monotonically-decreasing game
on Ω with weight vector Ew = (1, 1, 0, 0) is not best-response potential (so not better-response potential either). This implies
that the game on a continuous one-dimensional circular space is not better-response potential.
Proof. Suppose that these five players stand at A, B, C , D, and E respectively in the initial configuration. Their best response
dynamics can iterate forever as shown in Fig. 2. Therefore, this special isolation game is not best-response potential on
Ω . 
Even though the game is not potential, there exists a best-response sequence that converges to a Nash equilibrium
starting from any configuration. This is similar to Theorem 8 for single-selection games, except that here the sequences
are best-response ones, which are stronger than better-response ones.
Theorem 14. For the monotonically-decreasing isolation game with weight vector Ew = (1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) in a continuous one-
dimensional circular space Ω , from any configuration c, there exists a sequence of best-response moves in which each player
makes at most one best-response move and the sequence ends in a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we represent Ω as real points from 0 to 1 with 1 wrapped around to be the same as
0, and thus the position q of any player is a real value with 0 ≤ q < 1. We define clockwise distance α in Ω to be
α(x, y) = y − x if x ≤ y and α(x, y) = 1 − x + y if x > y. Note that ∆(x, y) = min(α(x, y), α(y, x)), so the two
distances are different. An arc from x to y, denoted as
a
a(x, y), is the portion of Ω from x to y in the clockwise direction,
i.e.,
a
a(x, y) = {z ∈ Ω | α(x, z) ≤ α(x, y)}.
Given a configuration c = (p1, p2, . . . , pk), we sort the positions of all k players in increasing order, breaking ties with
players’ identifiers, giving us a vector of positions (q1, q2, . . . , qk) with q1 ≤ q2 ≤ · · · ≤ qk, and a corresponding vector of
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players (a1, a2, . . . , ak). For i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, define i+ = i+ 1, and i− = i− 1, except that k+ = 1 and 1− = k. For every
qi, we denote succc(qi) = qi+ and predc(qi) = qi−. We say that each player ai is adjacent to two players ai− and ai+.
After the above preparation, we are now ready to proceed with the proof. Suppose that player i located at position pi in
configuration c has a best response p′i , giving a new configuration c ′. Let pa = predc(pi), pb = succc(pi), pc = predc′(p′i),
and pd = succc′(p′i). Let p′′i be the middle point of the arc
a
a(pc, pd), i.e., α(pc, p′′i ) = α(pc, pd)/2. We claim that p′′i must
also be a best response of player i in c , and α(pa, pb) ≤ α(pc, pd). This is because, in c ′, there are at least one player at pc
and one player at pd, so ut i(c ′) ≤ ∆(pc, p′i) + ∆(p′i, pd) ≤ α(pc, p′i) + α(p′i, pd) = α(pc, pd). On the other hand, if player i
moves to p′′i to give configuration c ′′, we have ut i(c ′′) = ∆(pc, p′′i ) + ∆(p′′i , pd) = α(pc, p′′i ) + α(p′′i , pd) = α(pc, pd). The
first equality holds because with player i at the middle point in arc
a
a(pc, pd), the two players on pc and pd must be the two
nearest players to i in c ′′, while the second equality holds because α(pc, p′′i ) = α(p′′i , pd) ≤ 1/2, so they are the same as
the corresponding ∆ distances. Therefore, we have ut i(c ′′) ≥ ut i(c ′). Since p′i is already a best response of i in c , p′′i must
also be a best response of i in c. Finally, if α(pa, pb) > α(pc, pd), i would be able to move to the middle point of
a
a(pa, pb) to
gain a utility α(pa, pb) > α(pc, pd) ≥ ut i(c ′), contradicting the fact that c ′ is the result of i’s best response move in c. Thus
α(pa, pb) ≤ α(pc, pd).
With the above claim, we only need to focus on a best response that is at the middle point of two adjacent players.
Henceforth, we refer to these asmiddle-point best responses. We denotemaxarc(c) as the length of themaximum arc of two
adjacent players in configuration c , that is, for c = (p1, p2, . . . , pk), maxarc(c) = max{α(pi, succc(pi)) | i = 1, 2, . . . , k}.
Next we claim that if configuration c ′ is the result of a middle-point best response move of some player in configuration c ,
thenmaxarc(c ′) ≤ maxarc(c).
Suppose, for a contradiction, thatmaxarc(c ′) > maxarc(c). Let player i be the one that makes a best response move in c.
Let pi be the position of i in c , and let pa = predc(pi) and pb = succ(pi). Let p′i be the position of i in c ′. There are two cases.
In the first case, p′i is not in the arc
a
a(pa, pb). In this case, all arcs of two adjacent players in c remain the same or decrease
in length, except
a
a(pa, pb), so bymaxarc(c ′) > maxarc(c)we have α(pa, pb) = maxarc(c ′), which is strictly greater than all
other arcs in c. However, this would imply that player i’s middle-point best response has to be themiddle point of α(pa, pb),
which means p′i is still in the arc
a
a(pa, pb), a contradiction. In the second case, we consider that p′i is still in the arc
a
a(pa, pb).
The only arc length changes are from α(pa, pi) and α(pi, pb) to α(pa, p′i) and α(p
′
i, pb). However, we know that p
′
i is the
middle point of arc
a
a(pa, pb), so max(α(pa, pi), α(pi, pb)) ≥ α(pa, p′i) = α(p′i, pb). Thusmaxarc(c ′) ≤ maxarc(c). Therefore,
the claim thatmaxarc(c ′) ≤ maxarc(c) holds.
We now consider a player iwho takes a middle-point best response move in a configuration c , resulting in c ′. We claim
that for all subsequent middle-point best response sequence starting from c ′ resulting in c ′′, both of the two adjacent arcs
of player i in c ′′ have lengths at least maxarc(c ′′)/2. We prove this claim by an induction on the number k of moves in
the middle-point best response sequence starting in c ′. In the base case k = 0, which means we consider c ′. Since i just
made a middle-point best response move, her two adjacent arcs in c ′ are of equal length, and the combined length must be
maxarc(c). From theprevious claim,maxarc(c) ≥ maxarc(c ′), so each adjacent arc of i in c ′ is at leastmaxarc(c ′)/2.Hence the
base case is true.Wenow show that the case of k+1 is true if the case of k is true. If the (k+1)thmove is again by player i, then
she moves to the middle point of the longest arc, and the case is the same as the base case. Let us now consider that a player
j 6= imakes the (k+ 1)th move. Suppose the configuration after kmiddle-point best responses is ck, and the configuration
after one more middle-point best response is ck+1. Let pi be the position of i in both ck and ck+1. Let pa = predck(pi) and
pc = predck+1(pi). If α(pa, pi) ≤ α(pc, pi), then by induction hypothesis α(pc, pi) ≥ α(pa, pi) ≥ maxarc(ck)/2. By the
previous claim we showed, maxarc(ck) ≥ maxarc(ck+1), so we have α(pc, pi) ≥ maxarc(ck+1)/2. If α(pa, pi) > α(pc, pi), it
must be that player jmoves to pc as her best response in ck. Then pc is the middle point of
a
a(pa, pi), and because pc is j’s best
response in ck, α(pc, pi) = maxarc(ck)/2 ≥ maxarc(ck+1)/2. Therefore, in ck+1 player i’s adjacent arc aa(pc, pi) must be at
leastmaxarc(ck+1)/2. The other adjacent arc of i can be argued symmetrically. Hence the claim is true.
We are now ready to construct the best response sequence leading to a Nash equilibrium from any configuration c.
Initially let S = {1, 2, . . . , k} be the set of all players, and let c0 = c. In each round i = 1, 2, . . . , find a player ji ∈ S that
can make a best response move in ci−1. If no such player exists, then let ci−1 = c ′ and we find the best response sequence
c0, c1, . . . , ci−1 = c ′. We will show that c ′ is a Nash equilibrium. If such a player exists, remove ji from S, let ji take a middle-
point best response resulting in a configuration ci, and then we go to round i+ 1. Suppose that the sequence ends at ct = c ′.
We have t ≤ k since each player makes at most one move in the sequence.
We now show that c ′ is a Nash equilibrium. Suppose, for a contradiction, that this is not true, which means there exists a
player lwho could make a best response move in c ′. Then this player l cannot be in S, since otherwise we will continue the
iteration. Therefore player lmakes one move in the sequence, and suppose that she ends at position pl. Let pa = predc′(pl)
and pb = succc′(pl). From the previous claim, we know that α(pa, pl) ≥ maxarc(c ′)/2 and α(pl, pb) ≥ maxarc(c ′)/2. This
means that α(pa, pb) ≥ maxarc(c ′), and if l has a best response in c ′, she always has amiddle-point best response bymoving
to the middle point p′l of arc
a
a(pa, pb). Since l’s utility strictly increases, we know that pl 6= p′l , and in c ′ there must be
another player j closer to l than one of the players at pa and pb. Without loss of generality, suppose that j is positioned at pj in
Y. Zhao et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 410 (2009) 4905–4919 4915
c ′ such that pj = predc′(pa) and α(pj, pl) < α(pl, pb). Since α(pj, pl) = α(pj, pa) + α(pa, pl), α(pa, pl) ≥ maxarc(c ′)/2,
and α(pl, pb) ≤ maxarc(c ′), we have α(pj, pa) < maxarc(c ′)/2. Suppose that player s is positioned at pa in c ′. From
α(pj, pa) < maxarc(c ′)/2, we know that player s does not make a move in the middle-point best response sequence from
c0 to ct = c ′, because otherwise by the previous claim we must have α(pj, pa) ≥ maxarc(c ′)/2. So s is still in S when we
conclude the sequence at ct = c ′. However, in c ′, we have uts(c ′) ≤ α(pj, pa)+ α(pa, pl) = α(pj, pl) < α(pl, pb), so player s
may move to the middle of
a
a(pl, pb) and obtain a better utility α(pl, pb). This means that we can still find a player s in S that
has a better (and thus best) response in c ′, contradicting the terminating condition of the sequence ending at c ′. Therefore, c ′
must be a Nash equilibrium. It is clear that in the sequence every player makes at most one move. This concludes the proof
of the theorem. 
If we extend from the one-dimensional circular space to a general symmetric space, there may be no Nash equilibrium
for isolation games with weight vector Ew = (1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) at all, as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 15. There is no Nash equilibrium for the four-player isolation game with weight vector Ew = (1, 1, 0) in the space with
five points {A, B, C,D, E} and the following distance matrix, where N > 21 (note that this distance function also satisfies the
triangle inequality).
∆ A B C D E
A 0 N − 6 N − 11 N − 1 N − 6
B N − 6 0 N − 8 N − 10 N − 1
C N − 11 N − 8 0 N − 1 N − 6
D N − 1 N − 10 N − 1 0 N − 10
E N − 6 N − 1 N − 6 N − 10 0
 .
Proof. Because the number of players is k = 4 and |Ω| = 5, there exists at least one free point not occupied by any player
in any configuration c. Now we will consider an arbitrary configuration c and show that it cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
If there exist two players i and j standing at the same point in c , then the utilities of player i and j are at most N − 1.
However, player i could achieve utility at least 2N − 20 by moving to a free point. Since N > 21, we have 2N − 20 > N − 1.
Hence a configuration with two players standing at the same point could not be a Nash equilibrium.
If the four players stand at different points in c , then we consider the remaining free point. There are five cases.
Case 1: the free point is A. The player standing at B has utility 2N − 18, and she could achieve utility 2N − 17 if she moves
to A.
Case 2: the free point is B. The player standing at C has utility 2N − 17, and she could achieve utility 2N − 16 if she moves
to B.
Case 3: the free point is C . The player standing at D has utility 2N − 20, and she could achieve utility 2N − 19 if she moves
to C .
Case 4: the free point is D. The player standing at E has utility 2N − 12, and she could achieve utility 2N − 11 if she moves
to D.
Case 5: the free point is E. The player standing at A has utility 2N − 17, and she could achieve utility 2N − 16 if she moves
to E.
Combining the five cases above, a configuration with four players standing at different points is not a Nash equilibrium
either. Therefore, there is no Nash equilibrium for the isolation game in this space. 
Using the above lemma as a basis, we further show that it is NP-complete to decide whether an isolation game with
weight vector (1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) on a general symmetric space has a Nash equilibrium. The proof is by reduction from the
3-Dimensional Matching problem.
Theorem 16. In a finite symmetric space (Ω,∆), it is NP-complete to decide the existence of a Nash equilibrium for the isolation
game with weight vector Ew = (1, 1, 0, . . . , 0).
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that the problem is in NP.We prove NP-hardness by reduction from the 3-Dimensional
Matching problem.
An instance of the 3-Dimensional Matching problem includes three disjoint sets X , Y and Z (each of size n) and a set
T = {T1, . . . , Tm} ⊆ X × Y × Z of ordered triples. The decision problem is to decide whether there are n triples in T so that
each element of X ∪ Y ∪ Z is contained in exactly one of these triples. The construction of an instance of the isolation game
from the above 3-Dimensional Matching instance is given below.
The finite symmetric spaceΩ has m + 5n points, divided into a left set L = {v1, v2, . . . , vm} and n right sets R1, . . . , Rn
such that Ri = {ui1, ui2, . . . , ui5} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Select a numberN > 46. For any two different points vi, vj ∈ L,∆(vi, vj) = N
if Ti and Tj have no common element, and∆(vi, vj) = N/2+1 otherwise. The distancewithin each Ri is given by the distance
matrix in Lemma 15 with ui1 = A, . . . , ui5 = E. For any v ∈ L and u ∈ Ri, ∆(u, v) = ∆(v, u) = N and for any u ∈ Ri and
u′ ∈ Rj with i 6= j,∆(u, u′) = N . Finally, the isolation game onΩ has 4n players.
We claim that there exists a Nash equilibrium for this isolation game onΩ if and only if there are n disjoint triples in the
3-Dimensional Matching instance.
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First, suppose that there is a solution to the 3-DimensionalMatching instance.Without loss of generality, assume that the
n disjoint triples are T1, . . . , Tn. Then we claim that configuration c = (v1, . . . , vn, u11, . . . , un1, u12, . . . , un2, u15, . . . , un5)
is a Nash equilibrium. In this configuration, every player in L has utility 2N . Since it is the maximum possible utility, no
player in L would want to change. Consider a player in Ri. Her utility is at least 2N − 12. If she moves to some point vj in
L, then because Tj at least intersects with one of T1, . . . , Tn, the maximum utility she may obtain is 3N/2 < 2N − 12 since
N > 46. So she will not move to L. If she moves to some other point in some Rj, using the distance matrix in Lemma 15, it is
easy to verify that she will not gain any better utility either. Hence c is a Nash equilibrium.
Conversely, suppose that there is a Nash equilibrium in the isolation game. Because k = 4n, |Ω| = 5n+m and |L| = m ,
there exist at least n free points not occupied by any player in the right sets in any configuration.
Consider the number of players positioned in the right set Ri. If there is a Nash equilibrium c , then the number of players
positioned in Ri cannot be 4 because of Lemma 15. We show that Ri has at most three players by arguing that the following
two cases are impossible.
Case 1: There are more than five players positioned in Ri. Then there exist two players standing at the same point, and
their utilities are at most N − 1. Hence, each of them would like to move to a free point to obtain a better utility of at least
2(N/2+ 1).
Case 2: There are five players positioned in Ri. If two or more players choose the same point, then it is the same as Case 1.
If the five players are positioned in different points in Ri, then there must exist another right set Rj in which at most three
players are positioned. Hence, there are at least two free points in Rj. Select a free point ujs 6= uj4. The player at ui4 could
increase her utility value from 2N − 20 to at least 2N − 19 by moving to ujs.
Therefore, we know that every right set Ri contains at most three players in c , which means that there are at least n
players positioned in L. Without loss of generality, we assume that there are n players who occupy points v1, . . . , vn (which
may have duplicates). We claim that triples T1, . . . , Tn form a solution to the 3-Dimensional Matching problem. Suppose, for
a contradiction, that this is not true, which means that there exist Ti and Tj among these n triples that have some common
element. By our construction, we have∆(vi, vj) = 0 or N/2+1. Then the utility of the player positioned at vi or vj is at most
3N/2+ 1. In this case, both of themwould want to move to a free point in a right set, since that will give them a utility of at
least 2(N−11). WhenN > 46, we have 2(N−11) > 3N/2+1. This contradicts the assumption that c is a Nash equilibrium.
Therefore, we find a solution for the 3-Dimensional Matching problem given a Nash equilibrium c of the isolation game. 
5. Computation of best responses in high dimensional spaces
We now turn to the problem of computing the best response of a player in a configuration. A brute-force search on all
points in the space can be done in O(k log k
√
D), where D is the size of the distance matrix. This is fine if the distance matrix
is explicitly given as input. However, it could become exponential if the space has a compact representation, such as an
n-dimensional grid with the L1 norm as the distance function. In this section, we present results in an n-dimensional
hypercube {0, 1}n with the Hamming distance, a special case of n-dimensional grids with the L1 norm.
Theorem 17. In a 2n-dimensional hypercube {0, 1}2n, it is NP-complete to decide whether a player could move to a point so that
her utility is at least n− 1 in the k-player nearest-neighbor isolation game with k bounded by poly(n).
Proof. Computing the distance between a pair of vertices in {0, 1}2n can be done in O(n) time. Since k is bounded by poly(n),
verifying whether a player is at least n−1 away from all her neighbors can be done in polynomial time. Hence this problem
is in NP.
We prove the NP-hardness by reduction from the NAE-3-SAT problem. NAE-3-SAT stands for ‘‘Not All Equal’’ 3SAT. An
instance of NAE-3-SAT (which is a CNF formula) has m clauses C1, C2, . . . , Cm, where each clause consists of three literals
and there are n variables x1, . . . , xn in total. The decision problem is to decide whether there is a feasible assignment such
that the CNF formula is satisfied and no clause of the formula has all literals evaluated to the same value. The construction
of a configuration c of the nearest-neighbor isolation game from the above NAE-3-SAT instance is given below.
The space Ω is the 2n-dimensional hypercube {0, 1}2n, so that each point in Ω is determined by 2n bits. The nearest-
neighbor isolation game has 4m(n−2)+1 players, divided intom+1 sets S1, . . . , Sm, Sm+1. The set Sm+1 consists of only one
player who is going to compute a better response, so her initial position does not matter. The set Si (i 6= m+ 1) consists of
4(n− 2) players. Clause Ci corresponds to Si, with 4(n− 2) players positioned at pi,1, . . . , pi,4(n−2) inΩ . Since each point pi,j
is determined by 2n bits, we partition these 2n bits into n consecutive pairs such that the kth pair stands for the (2k− 1)th
and 2kth bits of pi,j. We now show how to determine the 2n bits of pi,j given clause Ci.
Case 1: 1 ≤ j ≤ 2(n− 2). We first fix the three pairs of pi,j corresponding to the three literals of Ci, in the following way:
• If Ci contains the literal xk, then the kth pair of pi,j is 11.• If Ci contains the literal x¯k, then the kth pair of pi,j is 00.
We then fix the remaining n − 3 pairs. In the following description, the kth remaining pair means the kth pair after
excluding the three pairs already determined above.
• If j = 1, then all the n− 3 remaining pairs are 01.
• If j = 2, then all the n− 3 remaining pairs are 10, i.e., flipping the bits of all n− 3 remaining pairs in pi,1.
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• If j = 2k+ 1 for 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 3, the kth remaining pair is 10 and all other n− 4 remaining pairs are 01.
• If j = 2k+ 2 for 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 3, flipping the bits of all n− 3 remaining pairs in pi,j−1.
Case 2: 2(n− 2)+ 1 ≤ j ≤ 4(n− 2). In this case, pi,j is obtained by flipping all bits of pi,j−2(n−2).
Here we have fixed the 2n bits for all pi,j such that 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ 4(n− 2). We claim that there exists a p0 inΩ
such that mini,j∆(p0, pi,j) ≥ n− 1 if and only if there is a feasible assignment for the NAE-3-SAT instance.
First, suppose that there is a feasible assignment for the NAE-3-SAT instance. Thenwe fix the n pairs of p0 in the following
way, and claim that mini,j∆(p0, pi,j) ≥ n− 1.
• If xi is 0 in this feasible assignment, then let the ith pair of p0 be 00.
• If xi is 1 in this feasible assignment, then let the ith pair of p0 be 11.
Consider an arbitrary point pi,j whose corresponding clause Ci contains three variable xa, xb and xc . Therefore, the ath, bth
and cth pairs of pi,j are either 00 or 11, and the remaining pairs are either 01 or 10. Since p0 is fixed according to a solution
of NAE-3-SAT, p0 and pi,j have at least one and at most two common pairs among the ath, bth, and cth pairs. Hence these
three pairs could contribute two to ∆(p0, pi,j). For each of the remaining n − 3 pairs, p0 is either 11 or 00, and pi,j is either
01 or 10. Thus the remaining n − 3 pairs will contribute n − 3 to ∆(p0, pi,j). Therefore, ∆(p0, pi,j) ≥ 2 + (n − 3) = n − 1
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ 4(n− 2).
Conversely, suppose that there is a point p0 such that ∆(p0, pi,j) ≥ n − 1 for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m and 1 ≤ j ≤ 4(n − 2). We
first show that each pair of p0 is either 00 or 11. Suppose, for a contradiction, that at least one pair in p0 is neither 00 nor 11.
Case 1: Only one pair in p0 is neither 00 nor 11. Let this pair be the kth pair, and its value is 01 (the argument for 10 is
symmetric). There must exist a clause Ci that does not contain variable xk, otherwise all clauses contain variable xk and the
instance is solvable in P . Suppose that Ci contains variables xa, xb, and xc . We look at the remaining n−3 pairs of p0 excluding
the ath, bth, and cth pairs. Consider position pi,1, whose n−3 remaining pairs are all 01. The number of bits that are different
between p0 and pi,1 in these n− 3 remaining pairs is n− 4, since the kth pairs are the same, while each other pairs differ in
exactly one bit. The number of bits that are different between p0 and pi,1 in the ath, bth, and cth pairs could be 0, 2, 4 or 6,
since all these pairs are either 00 or 11. If it is 0 or 2, then ∆(p0, pi,1) ≤ n − 4 + 2 < n − 1. If it is 4 or 6, then we instead
use pi,2(n−2)+2, whose ath, bth, and cth pairs are flipped from pi,1 while the remaining n − 3 pairs are the same as pi−1. In
this case,∆(p0, pi,2(n−2)+2) ≤ n− 4+ 2 < n− 1. Therefore, we can always find a position pi,j such that∆(p0, pi,j) < n− 1,
contradicting the choice of p0.
Case 2: At least two pairs in p0 are neither 00 nor 11. Let the kth and the sth pairs be such two pairs. There must exist a
clause Ci that does not contain variable xk and xs, otherwise all clauses contain variable xk or xs and the instance is solvable
in P . Suppose that Ci contains variables xa, xb, and xc . We look at the remaining n− 3 pairs of p0 not containing the ath, bth,
and cth pairs. Suppose that these n − 3 remaining pairs contain t1 number of 00 or 11 pairs, t2 number of 01 pairs, and t3
number of 10 pairs, with t1+ t2+ t3 = n− 3. Without loss of generality we assume that t2 ≥ t3 (the argument for t2 ≤ t3 is
symmetric). Moreover, since the kth and sth pairs are in the n− 3 remaining pairs, we have t1 ≤ n− 5. By the construction
of the 4(n− 2) positions of pi,1, . . . , pi,4(n−2), we first find a position pi,j with 1 ≤ j ≤ 2(n− 2)with the following property:
(a) if t3 = 0, then all the n − 3 remaining pairs of pi,j are 01 (actually j = 1 in this case); and (b) if t3 ≥ 1 with the `th
pair being 10, then all the n − 3 remaining pairs of pi,j are 01 except that the `th pair is 10. With this selection of pi,j, the
number of different bits between p0 and pi,j in the n− 3 remaining pairs is t1 when t3 = 0 and t1 + 2(t3 − 1)when t3 ≥ 1.
For the former, we already have t1 ≤ n− 5, and for the latter, t1 + 2(t3 − 1) ≤ t1 + t2 + t3 − 2 = n− 5. So they differ in
at most n − 5 bits among the n − 3 remaining pairs. For the ath, bth, and cth pairs, if they differ in at most 3 bits, then we
have∆(p0, pi,j) ≤ n− 5+ 3 < n− 1. If they differ in at least 4 bits, then let j′ = j+ 2(n− 2)+ (−1)j+1, and it is easy to
verify that pi,j′ flips all bits from pi,j in the ath, bth, and cth pairs while has the same bits as pi,j in the remaining n− 3 pairs.
Then we have ∆(p0, pi,j′) ≤ n − 5 + 3 < n − 1. Thus, we can always find a pi,j whose distance to p0 is less than n − 1, a
contradiction.
Therefore all pairs of p0 are either 00 or 11. Then we can construct an assignment according to p0 and prove that this
assignment is a feasible solution for the NAE-3-SAT instance. The assignment is as follows.
• If the ith pair in p0 is 00, then we assign 0 to xi.
• If the ith pair in p0 is 11, then we assign 1 to xi.
To show that the above assignment is a solution, consider an arbitrary clause Ci. Comparing p0 with pi,1, we know that
they differ in exactly n − 3 bits in the n − 3 remaining pairs excluding the three pairs corresponding to Ci’s variables. For
the three pairs corresponding to the three variables, they cannot differ in 0 pair or 3 pairs. If they differ in 0 pair, then
∆(p0, pi,1) = n − 3 < n − 1; if they differ in 3 pairs, then taking pi,1+2(n−2), we have ∆(p0, pi,1+2(n−2)) = n − 3 < n − 1,
both contradicting the choice of p0. So p0 and pi,1 differ in one or two pairs. This means exactly that the above assignment
will make one or two literals true but not all of them or none of them. Since this is true for all clauses, it shows that the
assignment is a solution to the NAE-3-SAT problem. 
The above theorem leads to the following hardness result in computing best responses for a general class of isolation
games, with the nearest-neighbor game as a special case.
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Corollary 18. It is NP-hard to compute a best response for an isolation game in the space {0, 1}2n with weight vector Ew =
(∗, . . . , ∗, 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
c
, 0, . . . , 0) where c is a constant and ∗ is either 0 or 1.
Proof. If we want to compute a best response for a player x with weight vector Ew′ = (1, 0, . . . , 0), we can construct a
configuration of the isolation game with weight vector Ew = (∗, . . . , ∗, 1, 0, . . . , 0). In the new game, we replace each
player except x by c new players on the same point. And we can see that a best response for player x in the new game with
weight vector Ew is just a best response in the original game with weight vector Ew′. If we can compute a best response for
the game with Ew efficiently, then we can compute a best response for the game with Ew′ efficiently. However, Theorem 17
implies that it is NP-hard to compute a best response for Ew′, so it is also NP-hard to compute a best response for Ew. 
In contrast to the above corollary, if the weight vector has only nonzero entries towards the end of the vector, it is easy
to compute the best response, as shown in the following theorem.
Theorem 19. A best response for a k-player isolation game in the space {0, 1}n with Ew = (0, . . . , 0, 1, ∗, . . . , ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
c
) can be
computed in polynomial time where c is a constant, k is bounded by poly(n) and ∗ is either 0 or 1.
Proof. Consider a configuration κ = (p1, . . . , pk) in {0, 1}n with player i positioned at pi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. And here we
consider player k positioned at pk. Let Ewc be the vector of c entries that are the last c entries of Ew. We give the following
algorithm that computes a best response p′k of player k in configuration κ , and we prove that its running time is bounded by
poly(n).
Step 1: Repeat step 2 for all
(k−1
c
)
possible subsets S of c players among players {1, 2, . . . , k− 1}.
Step 2: Given such a subset S, consider a reduced isolation game with c + 1 players S ∪ {k} and weight vector Ewc . Consider
the configuration κS in which every player j ∈ S takes position pj as in κ and player k takes position pk. Compute the best
response pS of player k in this reduced game and its utility uS .
Step 3: Return the best response p′k as the pS computed in step 2 with the largest utility uS .
We prove the correctness of the algorithm by contradiction. Let player k’s utility at position p′k be u1 in the original game.
Suppose that p′k is computed in step 2 in a reduced game with S as the subset and utility uS . Since adding more players into
the reduced game will only increase the c largest distances to player k at p′k, we know that u1 ≥ uS . Now suppose for a
contradiction that there exists another position q that gives a better utility uq to player k than position p′k in the original
game, i.e. uq > u1. Let S ′ be the subset of c players who have the c largest distances to q. Consider the reduced game with S ′
as the subset in step 2. Since in the original game, player k only cares about the c largest neighbors, in the reduced game k’s
utility at position q is also uq. So the best response pS′ computed in step 2 has utility uS′ ≥ uq. Thus, we have the sequence
uS′ ≥ uq > u1 ≥ uS . However, since p′k is selected according to the largest utility in step 2, we have uS ≥ uS′ , a contradiction.
For time complexity, the number of iterations of step 2 is
(k−1
c
)
, which is poly(n) because k is bounded by poly(n) and c
is a constant. We now show how to compute each iteration of step 2 in polynomial time, and thus the overall algorithm is
polynomial.
Consider a set S of c players. To compute the best response pS in the reduced game with subset S, we argue that we
only need to check a polynomial number of candidate positions. Without loss of generality, let S = {1, 2, . . . , c}. Construct
matrixM = (mij)c×n wheremij represents the j-th bit of point pi.
Note that the number of unique column vectors in M is at most 2c , which is a constant. Suppose that for the ith unique
column vector, there are ti columns inM , corresponding to ti bits in a candidate position. Given any point p in the hypercube,
let npi denotes the number of bits 1 in the ti bits corresponding to the ith unique column vector inM . We claim that, for any
two points p and q, if npi = nqi for all i, then p and q give the same utility to player k in the reduced game. This is because the
distance function∆ is the Hamming Distance function, which means the distance between two points only depends on the
number of different bits between the two points. Therefore, only the number of bits 1 corresponding to each unique column
vector affects the distances to the players in S. Hence, givenmatrixM , we only need to check ti+1 different bit assignments
for each unique column vector. The total number of candidate positions we need to check is then
∏2c
i=1(ti + 1) = O(n2c ).
Since c is a constant, this is polynomial to n. For each candidate position, computing the utility at this position certainly
takes polynomial time. Therefore, each iteration of step 2 takes only polynomial time to complete. 
6. Final remarks
The isolation game is very simple in its definition. However, as shown in this paper, the behaviors of its Nash equilibria
and best response dynamics are quite rich and complex. This paper presents the first set of results on the isolation game and
lays the groundwork for the understanding of the impact of the farness measures and the underlying space to some basic
game-theoretic questions about the isolation game. We summarize the results of this paper in Table 1. It remains an open
question to fully characterize the isolation game. In particular, we would like to understand for what weight vectors the
isolation game on simple spaces, such as d-dimensional grids, hypercubes, and torus grid graphs, has potential functions,
has Nash equilibria, or has converging best (better) response sequences. What is the impact of distance functions, such as
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L1-norm or L2-norm to these questions? We would like to know whether it is NP-hard to determine if Nash equilibria exist
in these special spaces when the input is the weight vector.What canwe say about other continuous spaces such as squares,
cubes, balls, and spheres? For example, is there a sequence of better response dynamics that converges to a Nash equilibrium
in the isolation game on the sphere with Ew = (1, 1, 1, 0, . . . , 0)? What can we say about approximate Nash equilibria?
More concretely, in Lemma 7we show an example inwhich a single-selection gamewithweight vector (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) is
not better-response potential in onedimensional circular space. However,we verify that the game is best-response potential.
This phenomenon of being best-response potential but not better-response potential is rarely seen in other types of games.
Moreover, our experiments lead us to conjecture that all games on the continuous one dimensional circular space with
weight vector (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) are best-response potential. If the conjecture is true, we will find a large class of games that
are best-response potential but not better-response potential (the latter is implied by Lemma 7 for the continuous one
dimensional space), an interesting phenomenon not known in other common games.
Another line of research is to understand the connection between the isolation game and the Voronoi game.
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